Iran's Blackout Has Hit 66 Days and Smugglers Are the Last Line of Resistance

Key Takeaways

• Iran's internet has been at roughly 2% of normal levels since February 28, making it the longest state-imposed national blackout ever recorded.
• A clandestine network is smuggling Starlink terminals across Iran's borders, funded by Iranians abroad, to keep civilians connected.
• Iranian law criminalizes Starlink possession with up to 2 years in prison and distributing more than 10 devices with up to 10 years in prison. At least 100 people have been arrested.
• Only government officials and state media journalists retain full internet access via "white sim cards."
• Smugglers are now advising recipients to pair terminals with VPNs to avoid signal detection.

Sixty-Six Days Offline and the Regime Isn't Blinking

When US and Israeli strikes hit Iran on February 28, the regime did what it always does under pressure and cut the internet within minutes. The connectivity dropped to 4% of ordinary levels almost immediately, then flatlined at around 1%. Now, it’s been 66 consecutive days and counting at roughly 2% of normal, making this the longest state-imposed national internet blackout ever recorded.

It wasn't even the first blackout this year. A previous shutdown in January, imposed during a crackdown in which more than 6,500 people were killed and 53,000 arrested, lasted around 20 days before a partial restoration that held for exactly one month. Then February 28 erased it, and even a ceasefire, which was announced on April 8, had no impact on it. The blackout continued anyway, with no timeline and no justification that could survive basic scrutiny.

NetBlocks estimates the daily economic cost at over $37 million, with indirect losses pushing toward $80 million by some accounts. Government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani has said the internet will return "once the situation returns to normal," which, given that a ceasefire has already come and gone, is not promising in the least.

A Dozen Terminals at a Time, Across Whatever Border Opens

A BBC investigation has identified a clandestine network of activists running Starlink satellite terminals across Iran's borders, funded by Iranians abroad. One source, identified as Sahand, told the BBC he had sent a dozen terminals into Iran since January and that the network was "actively looking for other ways to smuggle in more." He spoke outside Iran, visibly anxious, aware that if he was actually identified, the regime would likely go after the people he's in contact with inside the country. "If even one extra person is able to access the internet," he said, "I think it's successful and it's worth it."

The risk is genuine, and the law is explicit. Iran passed legislation criminalizing Starlink possession with up to two years in prison for individual users and up to ten years for anyone caught distributing or importing more than ten devices. State-affiliated media has reported four arrests last month alone, including two foreign nationals, for importing satellite internet equipment, and a digital rights group estimated at least 100 people have been arrested for possession overall. That, combined with an alarming number of Starlink users being killed during inspection raids, paints a very gloomy picture of what the everyday reality for Iranians currently looks like.

Despite all of this, a Telegram channel called NasNet continues to operate publicly, with a volunteer saying approximately 5,000 terminals had been sold through it over two and a half years. Because authorities are now hunting for signal emissions, smugglers are advising users to run VPNs alongside Starlink to stay hidden.

When Only the Regime's Journalists Have Wi-Fi

The blackout has never applied equally. Around 16,000 officials and state media journalists retain full global internet access through "white sim cards," a system that has existed quietly since at least 2013. In April, the government launched "Internet Pro," offering selective connectivity to certain businesses and framing it as "maintaining business connectivity during the crisis." When a government decides which journalists get internet during a blackout, it has decided which version of events the world receives. And that is precisely what editorial control at the infrastructure level looks like.

The ceasefire arrived on April 8. The blackout did not end. The smugglers running terminals across borders at the risk of ten-year sentences are the only reason any Iranian testimony is reaching the outside world. Access Now recorded 313 internet shutdowns across 52 countries in 2025, the highest figure since tracking began in 2016, and Iran's model is the one every government with a kill switch is now studying. The question is what has already been learned from watching Iran run one this long without consequences, and who’s going to try to pull a similar trick next?