Pakistan Is Planning Another Internet Shutdown — This Time for a Political March

Key Takeaways

• The Punjab Home Department has written to the federal government requesting suspension or downgrading of mobile phone and internet services in selected areas of Rawalpindi and Attock from September 27th, ahead of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf's planned long march toward Islamabad.
• Requested locations include Brahma, Bahtar, Taxila, Wah Saddar, and Chakri in Rawalpindi, as well as specific areas of Attock; the request also covers internet jamming at selected sites.
• Punjab has imposed Section 144 across the province from September 23rd to October 5th, banning public gatherings of five or more people, and has requested Rangers deployment in Rawalpindi, Attock, Jhelum, and Mianwali for the same period.
• Containers have been placed at key entry points around Islamabad and Rawalpindi as security preparations intensify.
• Pakistan-administered Kashmir has been under a partial internet shutdown since June 5th — more than 100 days — imposed on the day protests over electoral reform began there.

According to Bloom Pakistan, the Punjab Home Department has asked the federal government to suspend or downgrade mobile phone and internet services in selected areas of Rawalpindi and Attock from September 27th. The request, made on the basis of a communication from the Central Police Office Punjab, cites concerns over the law-and-order situation ahead of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf's planned long march toward Islamabad.

The locations named in the request include Brahma, Bahtar, Taxila, Wah Saddar, and Chakri in Rawalpindi, as well as specific areas of Attock. The request also covers internet jamming — not just suspension of services, but active signal disruption — at selected sites along the route. 

Punjab has simultaneously imposed Section 144 across the entire province from September 23rd to October 5th, banning gatherings of five or more people in public places, roads, and open spaces. Rangers deployment has been requested in Rawalpindi, Attock, Jhelum, and Mianwali for the same period. Containers are being placed at key entry points into Islamabad and Rawalpindi.

The Same Playbook, a Different Target

This request arrives as Pakistan-administered Kashmir remains under a partial internet shutdown that began on June 5th — more than 100 days ago — imposed on the same day protests over electoral reform erupted there. That shutdown has outlasted the elections it was nominally imposed to manage, outlasted the formation of a new government, and continues to disrupt online banking, academic services, and everyday communication for the territory's entire population.

The mechanism being requested for Punjab is identical to the one applied in Kashmir: a request originates with a law enforcement body, passes through the Interior Ministry infrastructure, and is sent to the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority for implementation. As a legal analysis published in Opinio Juris documented in the context of the Kashmir shutdown, that process is a mechanical compliance chain that rarely challenges the directives it receives, with orders never released publicly and no meaningful avenue for legal challenge before the shutdown takes effect.

What differs between Kashmir and Punjab is the political target. In Kashmir, the shutdown was imposed against a grassroots movement demanding electoral reform and political accountability. In Punjab, it's being requested against PTI — the party of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, whose supporters have repeatedly attempted long marches toward Islamabad since his removal from power and subsequent imprisonment. The legal infrastructure is the same. The political context is different. The outcome for anyone trying to communicate, organize, or report in the affected areas will be identical.

What "Law and Order" Covers in Pakistan

Pakistan's justification for internet shutdowns is consistently framed in terms of law and order, national security, or public safety. Those framings aren’t always wrong — genuine security concerns can accompany large political gatherings — but they've become a standard label applied regardless of the specific situation, and the domestic legal architecture makes it nearly impossible to distinguish legitimate security measures from political suppression after the fact.

Shutting down mobile and internet services in a corridor along which a political march is planned does several things simultaneously. It prevents organizers from coordinating. It prevents journalists from reporting in real time. It prevents participants from communicating with each other or with family. It prevents anyone outside the affected area from getting accurate information about what is happening inside it. These are not side effects of a security measure. They are what a communications blackout does, by design, in the context of political assembly.

Pakistan is currently under significant international scrutiny for its treatment of political opposition. The Kashmir shutdown has drawn condemnation from the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, UN experts, and domestic rights bodies. 

A further shutdown in Punjab — this time explicitly timed to suppress a political march — adds to a pattern that the country's existing legal framework does nothing to check, and that its own human rights institutions have already documented as a systemic problem rather than a series of isolated incidents.

The shutdown hasn't happened yet as of this article's publication. Whether the federal government grants the Punjab Home Department's request remains to be seen. What's already clear is that the request exists, the infrastructure to fulfill it is in place, and Pakistan has granted requests like this before.